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Abstract
The problem of approximating a propositional cal-
culus is to find many-valued logics which are sound for
the calculus (i.e., all theorems of the calculus are tau-
tologies) with as few tautologies as possible. This has
potential applications for representing (computation-
ally complex) logics used in AI by (computationally
easy) many-valued logics. It is investigated how far
this method can be carried using (1) one or (2) an in-
finite sequence of many-valued logics. It is shown that
the optimal candidate matrices for (1) can be computed
from the calculus.
1 Introduction
The question of what to do when face to face with
a new logical calculus is an age-old problem of math-
ematical logic. One usually has, at least at first, no
semantics. For example, intuitionistic propositional
logic was constructed by Heyting only as a calculus;
semantics for it were proposed much later. Currently
we face a similar situation with Girard’s linear logic.
The lack of semantical methods makes it difficult to
answer questions such as: Are statements of a certain
form (un)derivable? Are the axioms independent? Is
the calculus consistent? For logics closed under substi-
tution many-valued methods have often proved valu-
able since they were first used for proving underivabil-
ities by Bernays [2] in 1926 (and later by others, e.g.,
McKinsey and Wajsberg; see also [12, § 25]). For the
above-mentioned underivability question it is neces-
sary to find many-valued matrices for which the given
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calculus is sound. If a formula is not a tautology under
such a matrix, it cannot be derivable in the calculus.
It is also necessary, of course, that the matrix has as
few tautologies as possible in order to be useful.
Such “optimal” approximations of a given calculus
may also have applications in computer science. In the
field of artificial intelligence many new (propositional)
logics have been introduced. They are usually better
suited to model the problems dealt with in AI than
traditional (classical, intuitionistic, or modal) logics,
but many have two significant drawbacks: First, they
are either given solely semantically or solely by a cal-
culus. For practical purposes, a proof theory is nec-
essary; otherwise computer representation of and au-
tomated search for proofs/truths in these logics is not
feasible. Second, most of them are intractable, and
hopelessly so, provided the polynomial hierarchy does
not collapse. For instance, many nonmonotonic for-
malisms have been shown to be hard for classes above
NP [5]. Although satisfiability in many-valued propo-
sitional logics is (as in classical logic) NP-complete
[11], this is still (probably) much better.
On the other hand, it is evident from the work
of Carnielli [3] and Ha¨hnle [8] on tableaux, and
Rousseau, Takahashi, and Baaz et al. [1] on sequents,
that finite-valued logics are, from the perspective of
proof and model theory, very close to classical logic.
Therefore, many-valued logic is a very suitable candi-
date if one looks for approximations, in some sense, of
given complex logics.
What is needed are methods for obtaining finite-
valued approximations of the propositional logics at
hand. It turns out, however, that a shift of emphasis
is in order here. While it is the logic we are actually
interested in, we always are given only a representa-
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tion of the logic. Hence, we have to concentrate on
approximations of the representation, and not of the
logic per se.
What is a representation of a logic? The first type
of representation that comes to mind is a calculus.
Hilbert-type calculi are the simplest conceptually and
the oldest historically. We will investigate the rela-
tionship between such calculi on the one hand and
many-valued logics or recursive sequences of many-
valued logics on the other hand. The latter notion
has received considerable attention in the literature
in the form of the following two problems: Given a
calculus C,
(1) find a minimal (finite) normal matrix for C
(relevant for non-derivability and independence
proofs), and
(2) find a sequence of finite-valued logics whose in-
tersection equals the theorems of C, and its con-
verse, given a sequence of finite-valued logics,
find a calculus for its intersection (exemplified
by Jas´kowski’s sequence for intuitionistic propo-
sitional calculus, and by Dummett’s extension
axiomatizing the intersection of the sequence of
Go¨del logics, respectively).
For (1), of course, the best case would be a finite-
valued logic M whose tautologies coincide with the
theorems of C. C then provides an axiomatization
of M. This of course is not always possible, at least
for finite-valued logics. Lindenbaum [10, Satz 3] has
shown that any logic (in our sense, given by a set of
rules and closed under substitution) can be character-
ized by an infinite-valued logic. For a discussion of
related questions see also Rescher [12, § 24].
In the following we will consider these questions in
a general setting. Consider a propositional Hilbert-
type calculus C. First of all, an optimal (i.e., minimal
under set inclusion of the tautologies) m-valued logic
for which C satisfies reasonable soundness properties
can be computed. We call such a logic normal for C.
The next question is, can we find an approximating
sequence of m-valued logics in the sense of (2)? It
is shown that this is impossible for undecidable cal-
culi C, and possible for all decidable logics closed un-
der substitution.
2 Propositional Logics
2.1. Definition A propositional language L consists
of the following:
(1) propositional variables: X0, X1, X2, . . . , Xj , . . .
(j ∈ ω)
(2) propositional connectives of arity nj : 2
n0
0 , 21,
. . . , 2r. If nj = 0, then 2j is called a proposi-
tional constant.
(3) Auxiliary symbols: (, ), and , (comma).
Formulas and subformulas are defined as usual.
We denote the set of formulas over a language L by
Frm(L). By Var(A) we mean the set of propositional
variables occurring in A.
2.2. Definition A propositional Hilbert-type calcu-
lus C in the language L is given by
(1) A finite set A(C) ⊆ Frm(L) of axioms.
(2) A finite set R(C) of rules of the form
A1 . . . An
A
r
where A, A1, . . . , An ∈ Frm(L)
A formula F is a theorem of L if there is a derivation
of F in C, i.e., a finite sequence
F1, F2, . . . , Fs = F
of formulas s.t. for each Fi either
(1) Fi is a substitution instance of an axiom in A(C),
or
(2) there are Fk1 , . . . , Fkn with kj < i and a rule
r ∈ R(C), s.t. Fkj is a substitution instance of
the j-th premise of r, and Fi is a substitution
instance of the conclusion.
If F is a theorem of C we write C ` F . The set of
theorems of C is denoted by Thm(C).
2.3. Remark The above notion of a propositional rule
is the one usually used in axiomatizations of propo-
sitional logic. It is, however, by no means the only
possible notion. For instance, Schu¨tte’s rules
A(>) A(⊥)
A(X)
C ↔ D
A(C)↔ A(D)
where X is a propositional variable, and A, C, and D
are formulas, does not fit under the above definition.
2.4. Definition A propositional logic L in the lan-
guage L is a subset of Frm(L) closed under substitu-
tion.
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Every propositional calculus C defines a propo-
sitional logic, namely Thm(C) ⊆ Frm(L), since
Thm(C) is closed under substitution. Not every
propositional logic, however, is axiomatizable, let
alone finitely axiomatizable by a Hilbert calculus. For
instance, the logic
{2k(>) | k is the Go¨del number of a
true sentence of arithmetic}
is not axiomatizable, whereas the logic
{2k(>) | k is prime}
is certainly axiomatizable (it is even decidable), but
not by a Hilbert calculus using only 2 and >. (It
is easily seen that any Hilbert calculus for 2 and >
has either only a finite number of theorems or yields
arithmetic progressions of 2’s.)
2.5. Definition A propositional finite-valued logic
M is given by a set of truth values V (M) = {1, 2,
. . . , m}, the set of designated truth values V +(M) ⊆
V (M), and a set of truth functions 2˜j :V (M)
nj →
V (M) for all connectives 2j ∈ L with arity nj .
The corresponding subset of Frm(L) of true formu-
las is the set of tautologies of M, defined as follows.
2.6. Definition A valuation I is a mapping from the
set of propositional variables into V (M). A valuation
I can be extended in the standard way to a function
from formulas to truth values. I satisfies a formula F ,
in symbols: I |=M F , if I(F ) ∈ V +(M). In that case,
I is called a model of F , otherwise a countermodel.
A formula F is a tautology of M iff it is satisfied by
every valuation. Then we write M |= F . We denote
the set of tautologies of M by Taut(M).
2.7. Example The sequence of m-valued Go¨del log-
ics Gm is given by V (Gm) = {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, the
designated values V +(Gm) = {0}, and the following
truth functions:
¬˜Gm(v) =
{
0 for v = m− 1
m− 1 for v 6= m− 1
∨˜Gm(v, w) = min(a, b)
∧˜Gm(v, w) = max(a, b)
⊃˜Gm(v, w) =
{
0 for v ≥ w
w for v < w
This sequence of logics was used in [6] to show that
intuitionistic logic cannot be characterized by a finite
matrix.
In the remaining sections, we will concentrate on
the relations between calculi C, logics L, and many-
valued logics M. The objective is to find many-valued
logics M (or sequences thereof) that, in a sense, ap-
proximate the calculus C and/or the logic L.
The following well-known product construction is
useful for characterizing the “intersection” of many-
valued logics.
2.8. Definition Let M and M′ be m and m′-valued
logics, respectively. Then M × M′ is the mm′-
valued logic where V (M ×M′) = V (M) × V (M′),
V +(M ×M′) = V +(M) × V +(M′), and truth func-
tions are defined component-wise. I.e., if 2 is an n-ary
connective, then
2˜M×M′(w1, . . . , wn) = 〈2˜M, 2˜M′〉.
2.9. Lemma Taut(M×M′) = Taut(M) ∩ Taut(M′)
The definition and lemma are easily generalized to
the case of finite products
∏
iMi by induction.
When looking for a logic with as small a number of
truth values as possible which falsifies a given formula
we can use the following construction.
2.10. Proposition Let M be any many-valued logic,
and A1, . . . , An be formulas not valid in M. Then
there is a finite-valued logic M′ = Φ(M, A1, . . . , An)
s.t.
(1) A1, . . . , An are not valid in M
′,
(2) Taut(M) ⊆ Taut(M′), and
(3) |V (M′)| ≤ ξ(A1, . . . , An), where ξ(A1, . . . , An) =∏n
i=1 ξ(Ai) and ξ(Ai) is the number of subformu-
las of Ai + 1.
This holds also if M has infinitely many truth values,
provided V (M), V +(M) and the truth functions are
recursive.
Proof. We first prove the proposition for n = 1.
Let I be the interpretation in M making A1 false, and
let B1, . . . , Br (ξ(A1) = r + 1) be all subformulas
of A1. Every Bi has a truth value ti in I. Let M
′
be as follows: V (M′) = {t1, . . . , tr,>}, V +(M′) =
V +(M) ∩ V (M′) ∪ {>}. If 2 ∈ L, define 2˜ by
2˜(v1, . . . , vn) =
{
ti if Bi ≡ 2(Bj1 , . . . , Bjn)
and v1 = tj1 , . . . , vn = tjn
> otherwise
(1) Since tr was undesignated in M, it is also undes-
ignated in M′. But I is also a truth value assignment
in M′, hence M′ 6|= A1.
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(2) Let C be a tautology of M, and let J be an
interpretation in M′. If no subformula of C evalu-
ates to > under J, then J is also an interpretation
in M, and C takes the same truth value in M′ as in
M w.r.t. J, which is designated also in M′. Otherwise,
C evaluates to >, which is designated in M′. So C is
a tautology in M′.
(3) Obvious.
For n > 1, the proposition follows by taking
Φ(M, A1, . . . , An) =
∏n
i=1 Φ(M, Ai)
3 Many-valued Covers for Calculi
We are looking for many-valued logics M s.t.
Thm(C) ⊆ Taut(M). M must, however, behave “nor-
mally” with respect to C, i.e., C must remain sound
whenever we add new operators and their truth tables
to M or add tautologies as axioms to C.
3.1. Definition An m-valued logic M is normal for
a calculus C (and C strongly sound for M) if
(∗) All axioms A ∈ A(C) are tautologies of M, and
for every rule r ∈ R(C): if a valuation satisfies
the premises of r, it also satisfies the conclusion.
M is then called a cover for C.
We would like to stress the distinction between
strong soundness, a.k.a. normality, and soundness.
The latter is the familiar property of a calculus to pro-
duce only valid formulas as theorems. This “plain”
soundness is what we actually would like to inves-
tigate in terms of approximations. More precisely,
when looking for a finite-valued logic that approxi-
mates a given calculus, we are content if we find a
logic for which C is sound. It is, however, not pos-
sible in general to test if a calculus is sound for a
given finite-valued logic. It is possible to test if it is
strongly sound. For this pragmatic reason we consider
only normal matrices for the given calculi. The next
proposition characterizes the normal matrices in terms
of strong soundness conditions. These are reasonable
conditions which one expects to hold of a “normal”
matrix.
3.2. Proposition C is strongly sound for a many-
valued logic M if Thm(C′) ⊆ Taut(M′) for all M′
and C′, where
(1) M′ is obtained from M by adding truth tables for
new operations, and
(2) C′ is obtained from C by adding tautologies of
M′ to as axioms.
Proof. If: First of all, C is sound for M: Let C ` F .
We show that M |= F by induction on the length l of
the derivation in C:
l = 1: This means F is a substitution instance of
an axiom A.
l > 1. F is the conclusion of a rule r ∈ R(C). If r
is
A1 . . . Ak
A
r
and X1, X2, . . . , Xn are all the variables in A, A1,
. . . , Ak, then the inference has the form
A1[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn] . . . Ak[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn]
F = A[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn]
Let I be a valuation of the variables in F , and let
vi = I(Bi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). By induction hypothesis,
the premises of r are valid. This implies that, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have {X1 7→ v1, . . . , Xn 7→ vn} |= Ai.
By hypothesis then, {X1 7→ v1, . . . , Xn 7→ vn} |= A.
But this means that I |= F . Hence, M |= F .
Moreover, C satisfies conditions (1) and (2) above.
Only if: Every axiom is derivable in C. By sound-
ness, it is a tautology of M, which is just what (∗)
says. Now let r ∈ R(C) be a rule, let I be an interpre-
tation which makes the premises A1, . . . , Ak of r true,
and let A be the conclusion of r. I assigns truth values
v1, . . . , vl to the variables X1, . . . , Xl in r. Let M
′ be
the m-valued logic resulting from M by extending the
language by the constants V1, . . . , Vl with values v1,
. . . , vl, respectively. Let σ be the substitution map-
ping Xi to Vi. The formulas A1σ, . . . , Alσ and (by r
also) Aσ are derivable in the extension C′ of C by the
axioms A1σ, . . . , Alσ. By (1) and (2), C
′ is sound, so
Aσ is a tautology in M′. Consequently, I |= A in M.
3.3. Corollary If C is strongly sound for M and r is
a directly dependent rule of C (i.e., r can be simulated
by the rules of C) then C + r is also strongly sound
for M.
3.4. Proposition It is decidable if a given proposi-
tional calculus is strongly sound for a given m-valued
logic.
Note also that for usual calculi, Property (∗) is rel-
atively easy to check. For instance, modus ponens is
strongly sound iff, whenever A is true, A ⊃ B is true
iff B is true; necessitation is strongly sound if 2X is
true whenever X is true.
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3.5. Example The IPC is strongly sound for the m-
valued Go¨del logics Gm. For instance, take axiom
a3: B ⊃ A ⊃ B. This is a tautology in Gm, for
assume we assign some truth values a and b to A and
B, respectively. We have two cases: If a ≤ b, then
(A ⊃ B) takes the value m − 1. Whatever b is, it
certainly is ≤ m − 1, hence B ⊃ A ⊃ B takes the
designated value m − 1. Otherwise, A ⊃ B takes the
value b, and again (since b ≤ b), B ⊃ A ⊃ B takes the
value m− 1.
Modus ponens passes the test: Assume A and A ⊃
B both take the value m− 1. This means that a ≤ b.
But a = m− 1, hence b = m− 1.
Now consider the following extension G>m of Gm:
V (G>m) = V (Gm)∪{>}, V +(G>m) = {m− 1,>}, and
the truth functions are given by:
2˜G>m(v¯) =
{> if > ∈ v¯
2˜Gm(v¯) otherwise
for 2 ∈ {¬,⊃,∧,∨}. Neither IPC nor LJ are strongly
sound for G>m, but LJ without cut is.
3.6. Example Consider the following calculus K:
X ↔˜©X
X ↔˜Y
X ↔˜©Y r1
X ↔˜X
Y
r2
It is easy to see that the corresponding logic consists of
all instances of X ↔˜©kX where k ≥ 1. This calculus
is only strongly sound for the m-valued logic having
all formulas as its tautologies. But if we leave out r2,
we can give a sequence of many-valued logics Mi, for
each of which K is strongly sound: Take for V (Mn) =
{0, . . . , n − 1}, V +(Mn) = {0}, with the following
truth functions:
©˜v =
{
v + 1 if v < n− 1
n− 1 otherwise
v˜˜↔w = { 0 if v < w or v = n− 1
1 otherwise
Obviously, Mn is a cover for K. On the other hand,
Taut(Mn) 6= Frm(L), e.g., any formula of the form
©(A) takes a (non-designated) value > 0 (for n > 1).
In fact, every formula of the form ©kX ↔˜X is falsified
in some Mn.
4 Optimal Covers
By Proposition 3.4 it is decidable if a given m-
valued logic M is a cover of C. Since we can enu-
merate all m-valued logics, we can also find all covers
of C. Moreover, comparing two many-valued logics as
to their sets of tautologies is decidable, as the next
theorem will show. Using this result, we see that we
can always generate optimal covers for L.
4.1. Definition For two many-valued logics M1 and
M2, we write M1 M2 iff Taut(M1) ⊆ Taut(M2).
M1 is better than M2, M1  M2, iff M1  M2
and Taut(M1) 6= Taut(M2).
4.2. Theorem Let two logics M1 and M2, m1-valued
and m2-valued respectively, be given. It is decidable
whether M1 M2.
Proof. It suffices to show the decidability of the fol-
lowing property: There is a formula A, s.t. (*) M2 |=
A but M1 6|= A. If this is the case, write M1 ∗ M2.
M1 M2 iff M1 
∗ M2 and not M2 ∗ M1.
We show this by giving an upper bound on the
depth of a minimal formula A satisfying the above
property. Since the set of formulas of L is enumer-
able, bounded search will produce such a formula iff
it exists. Note that the property (*) is decidable by
enumerating all assignments. In the following, let
m = max(m1,m2).
Let A be a formula that satisfies (*), i.e., there is a
valuation I s.t. I 6|=M1A. W.l.o.g. we can assume that
A contains at most m different variables: if it con-
tained more, some of them must be evaluated to the
same truth value in the counterexample I for M1 6|= A.
Unifying these variables leaves (*) intact.
Let B = {B1, B2, . . .} be the set of all subformulas
of A. Every formula Bj defines an m-valued truth
function f(Bj) of m variables where the values of the
variables which actually occur in Bj determine the
value of f(Bj) via the matrix of M2. On the other
hand, every Bj evaluates to a single truth value t(Bj)
in the countermodel I.
Consider the formula A′ constructed from A as fol-
lows: Let Bi be a subformula of A and Bj be a proper
subformula of Bi (and hence, a proper subformula
of A). If f(Bi) = f(Bj) and t(Bi) = t(Bj), replace
Bi in A with Bj . A
′ is shorter than A, and it still
satisfies (*). By iterating this construction until no
two subformulas have the desired property we obtain
a formula A∗. This procedure terminates, since A′ is
shorter than A; it preserves (*), since A′ remains a
tautology under M2 (we replace subformulas behav-
ing in exactly the same way under all valuations) and
the countermodel I is also a countermodel for A′.
The depth of A∗ is bounded above by mm
m+1 − 1.
This is seen as follows: If the depth of A∗ is d, then
there is a sequence A∗ = B′0, B
′
1, . . . , B
′
d of subfor-
mulas of A∗ where B′k is an immediate subformula of
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B′k−1. Every such B
′
k defines a truth function f(B
′
k) of
m variables in M2 and a truth valued t(B
′
k) in M1 via
I. There are mm
m
m-ary truth functions of m truth
values. The number of distinct truth function-truth
value pairs then is mm
m+1. If d ≥ mmm+1, then two
of the B′k, say B
′
i and B
′
j where B
′
j is a subformula of
B′i define the same truth function and the same truth
value. But then B′i could be replaced by B
′
j , contra-
dicting the way A∗ is defined.
4.3. Corollary It is decidable if two many-valued
logics define the same set of tautologies. The relation
 is decidable.
Proof. Taut(M1) = Taut(M2) iff neither M1 
∗
M2 nor M2 
∗ M1.
4.4. Proposition The optimal (i.e., minimal under
) m-valued covers of C are computable.
Proof. Consider the set C(C) of m-valued covers
of C. Since C(C) is finite and partially ordered by ,
C(C) contains minimal elements. The relation  is
decidable, hence the minimal covers can be computed.
4.5. Example By Example 3.5, IPC is strongly
sound for G3. The best 3-valued approximation
of IPC is the 3-valued Go¨del logic. In fact, it is the
only 3-valued approximation of any sound calculus C
(containing modus ponens) for IPL which has less tau-
tologies than CL.
Note that it is in general impossible to algorith-
mically construct a -minimal m-valued logic M (i.e.,
given independently of a calculus) with L ⊆ Taut(M),
because, e.g., it is undecidable whether M is empty or
not: e.g., take
L =
{
{2k(>)} if k is the least solution of D(x) = 0
∅ otherwise
where D(x) = 0 is the diophantine representation of
some undecidable set.
5 Sequential Approximations
In the previous section we have shown that it is al-
ways possible to obtain the best m-valued covers of a
given calculus, but there is no way to tell how good
these covers are. In this section, we investigate the
relation between sequences of many-valued logics and
the set of theorems of a calculus C. Such sequences
are called sequential approximations of C if they ver-
ify all theorems and refute all non-theorems of C. Put
another way, this is a question about the limitations
of Bernays’ method. On the negative side an imme-
diate result says that calculi for undecidable logics do
not have sequential approximations. If, however, a
propositional logic is decidable, it also has a sequen-
tial approximation (independent of a calculus).
5.1. Definition Let C be a calculus and let A =
〈M1,M2,M3, . . . ,Mj , . . .〉 (j ∈ ω) be a sequence of
many-valued logics s.t.
(1) A is given by a recursive procedure,
(2) Mi Mj iff i ≥ j, and
(3) Mi is a cover for C.
A is called a sequential approximation of C iff
Thm(C) =
⋂
j∈ω Taut(Mj). We say C is approx-
imable, if there is such a sequential approximation
for C.
Condition (2) above is technically not necessary.
Approximating sequences of logics in the literature
(see next example), however, satisfy this condition.
Furthermore, with the emphasis on “approximation,”
it seems more natural that the sequence gets succes-
sively “better.”
5.2. Example Consider the sequence G = 〈Gi〉i≥2
of Go¨del logics and intuitionistic propositional logic
IPC. Taut(Gi) ⊃ Thm(IPC), since Gi is a cover
for IPC. Furthermore, Gi+1  Gi. This has
been pointed out by [6], for a detailed proof see [7,
Satz 3.4.1]. It is, however, not a sequential approxi-
mation of IPC: The formula (A ⊃ B)∨(B ⊃ A), while
not a theorem of IPL, is a tautology of all Gi. In fact,⋂
j≥2 Taut(Gi) is the set of tautologies of the infinite-
valued Go¨del logic Gℵ, which is axiomatized by the
rules of IPC plus the above formula. This has been
shown in [4] (see also [7, § 3.4]). Hence, G is a sequen-
tial approximation of Gℵ = IPC+(A ⊃ B)∨(B ⊃ A).
Jas´kowski [9] gave a sequential approximation of
IPC.
The natural question to ask is: Which calculi are
approximable? First we give the unsurprising negative
answer for undecidable calculi.
5.3. Proposition If C is undecidable, then it is not
approximable.
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Proof. If C were approximable, there were a se-
quence A = 〈M1,M2,M3, . . .〉 s.t.
⋂
j≥2 Taut(Mj) =
Thm(C). IfN is a non-theorem ofC, then there would
be an index i s.t. N is false in Mi. But this would yield
a semi-decision procedure for non-theorems of C: Try
for each j whether N is false in Mj . If N is a non-
theorem, this will be established at j = i, if not, we
may go on forever. This contradicts the assumption
that the non-theorems of C are not r.e. (C is undecid-
able and the theorems are r.e.).
5.4. Theorem Every decidable propositional logic L
(closed under substitution) has a sequential approxi-
mation.
Proof. The proof uses an argument similar to that
of Lindenbaum [10, Satz 3]. Let Frmi(L) ⊂ Frm(L) be
the set of formulas of depth ≤ i (which is finite up to
renaming of variables). To every formula F ∈ Frm(L)
we assign a code dF e, yielding the sets dFrmi(L)e for
all i ∈ ω. We construct a sequential approximation
of L as follows: V (Mi) = dFrmi(L)e ∪ {>}, with the
designated values V +(Mi) = dFrmi(L)e ∩ dLe ∪ {>}.
The truth tables for Mi are given by:
2˜Mi(v1, . . . , vn) =
=
{ d2(F1, . . . , Fn)e if vj = dFje for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
and 2(F1, . . . , Fn) ∈ Frmi(L)
> otherwise
Mi is constructed in such a way as to agree with L
on all formulas of depth ≤ i, and to make all formulas
of depth > i true. Hence, Taut(Mi) ⊇ L, and Mi 
Mi+1. Every formula F false in L is also false in some
Mi (namely in all Mi with i ≥ the depth of F ).
6 Conclusion
The main open problem, especially in view of possi-
ble applications in computer science, is the complexity
of the computation of optimal covers. One would ex-
pect that it is tractable at least for some reasonable
classes of calculi which are syntactically characteriz-
able, e.g., analytic calculi.
A second problem is in how far approximations can
be found for first-order logics and calculi. One obsta-
cle, for instance, is that it is difficult to check whether
a matrix is normal for a given calculus, in particular
if the rules of the calculus are not “monadic” in the
sense that they manipulate more than one variable
at a time. In any case, a systematic treatment only
seems feasible for many-valued logics with, at most,
distribution quantifiers [3].
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